Call Me, Beep Me, if Ya Wanna Reach Me -- Unless I Might Be Driving: An Analysis of Sender Liability and Why Pennsylvania Should Not Hold Citizens Responsible for Car Accidents Caused by the Drivers They Text by Cronin, Michaela
Volume 63 Issue 2 Article 4 
9-1-2018 
Call Me, Beep Me, if Ya Wanna Reach Me -- Unless I Might Be 
Driving: An Analysis of Sender Liability and Why Pennsylvania 
Should Not Hold Citizens Responsible for Car Accidents Caused 
by the Drivers They Text 
Michaela Cronin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michaela Cronin, Call Me, Beep Me, if Ya Wanna Reach Me -- Unless I Might Be Driving: An Analysis of 
Sender Liability and Why Pennsylvania Should Not Hold Citizens Responsible for Car Accidents Caused by 
the Drivers They Text, 63 Vill. L. Rev. 321 (2018). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss2/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2018]
Comment
CALL ME, BEEP ME, IF YA WANNA REACH ME—UNLESS I MIGHT
BE DRIVING: AN ANALYSIS OF SENDER LIABILITY AND WHY
PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD NOT HOLD CITIZENS RESPONSIBLE FOR
CAR ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY THE DRIVERS THEY TEXT
MICHAELA CRONIN*
I. I’M YOUR BASIC AVERAGE CASE LAW AND I’M HERE TO SAVE THE
WORLD (FROM TEXTERS): AN INTRODUCTION
TO SENDER LIABILITY
Is there blood on your touchscreen?  Check again, because your cellu-
lar activity in this very moment could be legally responsible for claiming
the life of another person miles away.1  In some contexts, this isn’t so hard
to believe.2  For example, it seems understandable why a court would con-
vict a girl of involuntary manslaughter after she sent text messages encour-
aging her boyfriend to commit suicide, as in the recent and highly
publicized case of Michelle Carter.3  Although controversial, the court was
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Linda Cronin and Susan Newcomb, and my twin sister, Mackenzie Cronin, who
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also like to thank Sharon O’Reilly for helping create the theme of my Comment,
Lauren DeBona and Charlotte Merritt for giving me a family at Villanova, and
everyone on Villanova Law Review who has helped me pursue my goals as a Staff
Writer, student, and young professional.
The headings used throughout this Comment were inspired by the theme
song for the Disney Channel television series Kim Possible. See CHRISTINA MILIAN,
CALL ME, BEEP ME! (The Kim Possible Song), on THE KIM POSSIBLE SOUNDTRACK
(Walt Disney Records 2003).
1. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1065 (Mass. 2016) (de-
nying defendant’s motion to dismiss indictment for involuntary manslaughter after
defendant, through a series of text messages, encouraged boyfriend to commit
suicide).  For a further discussion of Carter, in which the defendant was indicted on
charges of involuntary manslaughter of a victim located miles away, see infra note 3
and accompanying text.
2. See Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1057–59 (discussing conduct of defendant).  For a
further discussion of the facts of Carter, see infra note 3.
3. See id. at 1059–65 (discussing court’s reasoning for affirming defendant’s
indictment for involuntary manslaughter after she encouraged her boyfriend to
commit suicide through series of text messages).  In Carter, after the victim was
found dead in his car, medical examiners concluded that he “had died after inhal-
ing carbon monoxide that was produced by a gasoline powered water pump lo-
cated in the [victim’s] truck” and that “[t]he manner of death was suicide.” See id.
at 1056.  Transcripts of text messages exchanged between the defendant and the
victim leading up to the victim’s death showed that “the defendant encouraged the
victim to kill himself, instructed him as to when and how he should kill himself,
(321)
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ultimately convinced that there was probable cause for a grand jury to
consider Carter’s messages lethal despite her remote physical location at
the time of the victim’s death.4
Mobile application developers have also faced legal action for alleg-
edly remotely contributing to the injury or death of others.5  In 2014, the
family of Sophia Liu sued Uber, a ride-share service, after its driver hit and
killed the young girl while distracted by his mobile Uber application,
which required him to input data while driving.6  One year later, a driver
took legal action against Snapchat, a mobile photo-sharing platform, for
allegedly inciting drivers to travel at excessive speeds in order to capture
them on the application’s “speed-filter.”7  That same year, Apple faced a
lawsuit for failing to incorporate a message-locking feature in its iPhone
devices that would prevent iPhone users from texting while driving.8
assuaged his concerns over killing himself, and chastised him when he delayed
doing so.” Id. at 1057–58 (footnotes omitted).  In particular, while the victim was
in the process of committing suicide, he “got out of his truck because he was
‘scared,’ and the defendant commanded him to get back in” via text message. See
id. at 1059 (footnote omitted).  The defendant admitted that she could have pre-
vented the victim’s suicide, signifying that she understood her role in his death.
See id.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable of cause, and
argued that “because she neither was physically present when the victim killed him-
self nor provided the victim with the instrument with which he killed himself,” she
could not be held legally responsible for his death. See id. at 1061.  The court
rejected her argument, explaining that although it had never before considered
“an indictment [for involuntary manslaughter] against a defendant on the basis of
words alone,” the crime of involuntary manslaughter had never required a physical
act in execution of the victim’s death. See id. at 1062.  After discussing several cases
in which the court had previously “contemplated the charge of involuntary man-
slaughter against a defendant where the death of the victim [was] self-inflicted,”
the court determined that the defendant’s communications with the victim in his
final moments overcame “any independent will to live he might have had.” Id. at
1062–63 (citations omitted).  As a result, the court held that sufficient evidence
existed to find probable cause that the defendant had committed involuntary man-
slaughter by way of wanton or reckless conduct. Id. at 1063.
4. See id.  For a discussion of the court’s analysis in Carter, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of cases brought against mobile application developers for
allegedly remotely contributing to the injury or death of others, see infra notes 6–8
and accompanying text.
6. See Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial at 9–16, Liu v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-536979, 2014 WL 285058 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2014)
(stating plaintiff’s claim that Uber caused its driver to hit decedent).
7. See Maynard v. McGee, No. 16-SV-89, 2017 WL 384288, at *2–3 (Ga. St. Ct.
Jan. 20, 2017) (addressing claim brought against Snapchat, Inc. for alleged role in
causing death).  In Maynard, Snapchat’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim was granted because the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Communica-
tions Decency Act, which “protect[s] Internet platforms from the threat of tort-
based lawsuits and maintain[s] the robust nature of Internet communication.” See
id. at *2 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1998))).
8. See Meador v. Apple, Inc., No 6:15-cv-715-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 3529577, at
*2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal filed, No.17-40968 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2017)
(addressing claim brought against Apple for causing injury).  In Meador, the plain-
2
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These situations raise legal questions of increasing significance as
people continue to rely on mobile technology to communicate with others
down the road, in another state, and across the globe.9  Facing liability for
encouraging a suicide via text or developing mobile software programs to
be used while driving may appear to be a remote occurrence.10  Neverthe-
less, anyone carrying a cell phone could be much more capable of killing
than they might expect, based on the controversial theory of “sender lia-
bility.”11  This theory, established by a New Jersey court in Kubert v. Best,12
allows a plaintiff injured in an automobile accident to hold a remote party
responsible for their injuries if that remote party sent a text message to the
driver of the car knowing that the  recipient of the message was driving,
and that message distracted the recipient and ultimately contributed to
the collision.13
tiffs brought strict liability and negligence claims against Apple after a non-party
allegedly “used her iPhone to check messages while driving, was inattentive to the
road and, therefore, caused injury to the Plaintiffs.” See id. at *1.  The plaintiffs
claimed that Apple had unreasonably and dangerously designed and marketed its
iPhones by failing to install software in them that would automatically prohibit
iPhone owners from using the devices while driving and by failing to warn custom-
ers of the dangers of using the iPhone while driving. See id.  The district court
adopted the report and recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge,
which recommended that the plaintiffs’ claims against Apple be dismissed with
prejudice because (1) the plaintiffs did not establish that defective design or mar-
keting of the iPhone caused the accident or resulting injuries, and (2) “any defec-
tive or negligent design was too attenuated from Plaintiffs’ injuries because of [the
driver’s] neglect of her duty to safely operate her vehicle.” See id. (citation
omitted).
9. Cf. Global Mobile Data Traffic from 2016 to 2021 (in Exabytes per Month),
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/271405/global-mobile-data-traffic-
forecast/ [https://perma.cc/J68M-GKWU] (last visited Sept. 18, 2017) (“In 2016,
global mobile data traffic amounted to 7 exabytes per month.  In 2021, mobile
data traffic worldwide is expected to reach 49 exabytes per month at a compound
annual growth rate of 47 percent.  Everyday mobile activities such as mobile social
media usage, including mobile chat and voice or video calls, and mobile e-com-
merce drive mobile traffic . . . .”).
10. For a discussion of a case in which a defendant was convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter for encouraging her boyfriend via text message to commit sui-
cide, see supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of cases in
which mobile application developers were sued for creating software for use while
driving, see supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1219, 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2013).
12. 75 A.3d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
13. See id. at 1229 (holding “when a texter knows or has special reason to
know that the intended recipient is driving and is likely to read the text message
while driving, the texter has a duty to users of the public roads to refrain from
sending the driver a text at that time”); Emily K. Strider, Note, Don’t Text a Driver:
Civil Liability of Remote Third-Party Texters After Kubert v. Best, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1003, 1017 (2015) (discussing the foreseeability approach to sender liability
outlined by Kubert).
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Since Kubert, similar cases have been brought in New York and Penn-
sylvania.14  While New York refused to adopt sender liability in Vega v.
Crane,15 the Pennsylvania case, Gallatin v. Gargiulo,16 sustained a plaintiff’s
complaint on a theory of sender liability, but the case was eventually set-
tled before the court heard a motion for summary judgment.17  Despite
the lack of Pennsylvania precedent on sender liability, the Court of Com-
mon Pleas in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania relied on Kubert to allow Gal-
latin to proceed against two remote texters, signifying the possible
adoption of sender liability.18
As the third state in the country to consider the theory of sender lia-
bility after it has been adopted by one state and rejected by another, the
next Pennsylvania court to decide the issue has the potential to tip the
scales and establish a majority stance on the issue for other states to fol-
low.19  Although it is impossible to be sure how a Pennsylvania court will
rule, it is clear that, after an increase in the frequency of in-state distracted
driving, the state has prioritized reducing the practice of texting and driv-
ing.20  In 2016, Pennsylvania implemented “Daniel’s Law” in the name of
the decedent in Gallatin, which increased the penalties for accidents
14. See Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 271 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (considering the-
ory of sender liability in New York); Gallatin v. Gargiulo, No. 10401 of 2015, C.A.,
2016 WL 8715650, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Lawrence Cty. Mar. 10, 2016) (acknowl-
edging possibility of applying sender liability in Pennsylvania).
15. 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 271 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (refusing to adopt sender liability in
New York).  For a further discussion of the Vega decision, see infra notes 46–61 and
accompanying text.
16. No. 10401 of 2015, C.A., 2016 WL 8715650 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Lawrence
Cty. Mar. 10, 2016).  For a discussion of the most recent developments in Gallatin,
see infra notes 63–74 and accompanying text.  Note that before a motion for sum-
mary judgment was heard in this case, the parties agreed to a voluntary dismissal;
thus, the Pennsylvania trial court did not render a decision on the merits of the
case.
17. See Fredrick Kunkle, Case Dismissed Against Person Who Texted Driver in Fatal
Pennsylvania Crash, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/tripping/wp/2018/02/03/case-dismissed-against-person-who-texted-driver-
in-fatal-pennsylvania-crash/?utm_term=.68849145b436 [https://perma.cc/ECG6-
C6H6].
18. See Gallatin, 2016 WL 8715650, at *4 (citing Kubert to acknowledge that
“sender of a text message can be liable for sending a text message while the recipi-
ent is operating a motor vehicle if the sender knew or had reason to know the
recipient was driving”).  For further discussion of the Kubert decision, see infra
notes 26–45 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the opposing conclusions reached by New Jersey and
New York on the adoption of sender liability, see infra notes 26–61.
20. See Is Distracted Driving on the Rise in Pennsylvania Despite Legal Bans?, CO-
HEN, FEELEY, ALTEMOSE & RAMBO, http://www.cohenfeeley.com/Articles/Is-dis-
tracted-driving-on-the-rise-in-Pennsylvania-despite-legal-bans.shtml [https://perma
.cc/MET5-AZPK] (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) (“According to Fox News, last year
alone, Pennsylvania drivers received 2,121 citations for distracted driving behav-
iors, such as texting or wearing earphones.  The 1,410 drivers cited for texting in
2014 represented an increase over the 1,190 and 1,340 drivers cited in 2012 and
2013.”).
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caused by texting and driving that result in serious bodily injury or
death.21
This Comment discusses the development of the law concerning the
liability of remote texters involved in texting and driving accidents, and
why Pennsylvania should not accept the theory of sender liability.22  First,
Part II summarizes the recent New York and New Jersey case law discussing
this topic.23  Part III examines developments made in the Gallatin case,
existing Pennsylvania statutory law concerning texting and driving, and
areas of Pennsylvania law analogous to sender liability.24  Finally, Part IV
of this Comment analyzes why Pennsylvania should not adopt New Jersey’s
Kubert theory of sender liability, and should instead abide by the Kubert
concurrence.25
21. See New PA Law Increases Penalties for Texting While Driving, WGAL NEWS 9
LOCAL PA. (Jan. 4, 2017, 12:35 PM), http://www.wgal.com/article/new-pa-law-in-
creases-penalties-for-texting-while-driving/8243936 [https://perma.cc/X5ZD-
XDCN] (“This law is named for Daniel Gallatin, a father, grandfather, military
veteran, and fireman of nearly 40 years who was killed in May of 2013 when his
motorcycle was struck from behind by someone who was texting while driving.”);
cf. Morgan Gough, Comment, Judicial Messaging: Remote Texter Liability As Public
Education, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 478–88 (2015) (explaining sender liability as
method of public education on dangers of texting and driving).  Gough expressed
that imposing legal responsibility for texting a driver could be necessary in order
to entice the public to pay better attention to the risks associated with texting and
driving. Id. at 470.  Gough states, “Today’s society is apathetic to the risks involved
with distracted driving.  Public service announcements, peer discussion, and even
the prospect of a traffic ticket have failed to stem this serious hazard.  Could the
threat of civil liability accomplish what all of these conventional approaches to
public education have not?” Id.  Other states have taken alternative routes in con-
demning texting and driving behavior through the law. See, e.g., Ashlee Kieler, New
York Bill Would Require Drivers Involved in Crashes to Submit Phones to “Textalyzer”, CON-
SUMERIST (April 12, 2016, 01:03 PM), https://consumerist.com/2016/04/12/new-
york-bill-would-require-drivers-involved-in-crashes-to-submit-phones-to-textalyzer/
[https://perma.cc/X9UY-DLP7] (explaining proposed “textalyzer” legislation that
would require drivers to submit cell phones after car crashes for evaluation by
device that would determine if driver was texting before accident).
22. For a discussion of the development of the law concerning the liability of
remote texters involved in texting-while-driving accidents and why Pennsylvania
should not accept the theory of sender liability, see infra notes 27–61, 62–179, and
accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the facts, analyses, and holdings reached in cases heard
by the New Jersey and New York courts regarding the theory of sender liability, see
infra Part II.
24. For a discussion of the facts that led the first Pennsylvania court to con-
sider the theory of sender liability, as well as a discussion of existing Pennsylvania
law concerning texting and driving, passenger liability, social host liability, and the
duty owed by a physician to patients, see infra Part III.  Note that while the Gallatin
case settled out of court, the trial court’s opinion recognizing the possibility of
sender liability in Pennsylvania remains as persuasive authority for future plaintiffs.
See Gallatin v. Gargiulo, No. 10401 of 2015, C.A., 2016 WL 8715650, at *3–4 (Pa.
Ct. Com. Pl. Lawrence Cty. Mar. 10, 2016).
25. For a discussion of why Pennsylvania ought to adopt the reasoning of the
Kubert concurrence rather than its majority opinion, see infra Part IV.
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II. DANGER OR TROUBLE, I’M THERE ON THE DOUBLE: THE DEBATE OVER
THE LIABILITY OF REMOTE TEXTERS IN NEW JERSEY
AND NEW YORK
The theory of sender liability has been evaluated in two state courts
thus far.26  It was first established by New Jersey in Kubert.27  Four years
later, a New York court debated the theory in the case of Vega, and ulti-
mately rejected it.28
A. New Jersey’s Establishment of Sender Liability in Kubert v. Best
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division heard the case
of Kubert in 2013.29  In Kubert, plaintiffs Linda and David Kubert were
badly injured when defendant Kyle Best was texting while driving, crossed
the center line of the road, and hit the Kuberts’ motorcycle head-on.30
After discovering that Best became distracted by text messages exchanged
with his friend, Shannon Colonna, immediately before the collision, the
Kuberts added her to the lawsuit.31  Although not enough evidence ex-
26. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013)
(establishing theory of sender liability); Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 271 (Sup.
Ct. 2017) (refusing to adopt theory of sender liability).  For a discussion of the
opposing conclusions reached by New Jersey and New York on the adoption of
sender liability, see infra Part II.
27. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229 (“When a sender texts a person who is then
driving, knowing that the driver will immediately view the text, the sender has
disregarded the attendant and foreseeable harm to the public.”).
28. See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 271 (refusing to adopt theory of sender liability
and stating that “[w]ith texting being as profligate, the potential expansion [of
liability] as contemplated by the Plaintiff is astronomical”).
29. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1218–19 (considering issue of first impression
against remote texters).
30. See id. at 1219.  David Kubert was driving the motorcycle with his wife
Linda riding as a passenger. See id.  “As they came south around a curve, . . . a pick-
up truck being driven north by” Best crossed the center line of the road into their
lane, traveling head-on towards the Kuberts. Id.  David Kubert attempted to evade
Best’s vehicle, but was unsuccessful, and Best’s vehicle collided with the Kuberts
and their motorcycle. See id.  “The collision severed, or nearly severed, David’s left
leg.  It shattered Linda’s left leg, leaving her fractured thighbone protruding out
of the skin as she lay injured in the road.” Id.  “Medical treatment could not save
either victim’s leg,” and thus “[b]oth lost their left legs as a result of the accident.”
Id.
31. See id. at 1219–22.  Cell phone records showed that Best and Colonna had
exchanged sixty-two text messages on the day of the accident. See id. at 1219.
Colonna testified that in a normal day, she would likely send over one hundred
text messages, which she felt was typical of a young teenager. See id. at 1219–20.
She also stated that “she generally did not pay attention to whether the recipient of
her texts was driving a car at the time or not.” Id. at 20.  Colonna apparently
thought it was odd that the plaintiff’s attorney was trying to “pin her down on
whether she knew that Best was driving when she texted him.” See id.
Although the context of the text messages between Best and Colonna was not
introduced as evidence, the exact timing of the messages was compared to the
time at which Best placed a phone call to 911 immediately after the accident to
conclude that Best had been texting Colonna in the moments before the crash.
6
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isted to ultimately establish liability on behalf of Colonna, the court ruled
that “a person sending text messages has a duty not to text someone who is
driving if the texter knows, or has special reason to know, the recipient will
view the text while driving.”32
As a basis for its decision, the court cited section 303 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (Restatement), which states that “[a]n act is negligent if
the actor intends it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to
affect, the conduct of another, a third person, or an animal in such a man-
ner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other.”33  To illustrate
section 303’s relevance, Colonna was likened to that of a passenger physi-
cally present in Best’s vehicle.34  The court reasoned that from a passen-
ger’s well-recognized duty to avoid interfering with the operations of a
driver stems a passenger’s duty not to encourage a driver to look away
from the road to attend to visual distractors, which exists so long as “the
passenger knows, or has special reason to know, that the driver will in fact
be distracted and drive negligently as a result of the passenger’s actions.”35
This duty owned by passengers laid the foundation for the creation of a
duty owed from remote texters to parties injured in distracted driving
accidents.36
See id. at 1220–21.  “Seventeen seconds elapsed from Best’s sending a text to
Colonna and the time of the 911 call after the accident,” during which Best must
have been “stopping his vehicle, observing the injuries to the Kuberts, and dialing
911.” Id. at 1220.  The court concluded that the text sent to Colonna by Best
before he called 911 was a response to a text Colonna had sent him twenty-five
seconds prior. Id. at 1220–21.  The evidence also suggested that Best had initiated
the texting conversation with Colonna “as he was about to and after he began”
driving. See id. at 1221.
32. See id. at 1221.  The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division af-
firmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims against Colonna because
the plaintiffs did not sufficiently prove Colonna knew Best was driving. See id. at
1221.
33. See id. at 1226 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 (AM. LAW
INST. 1965)).  The court also noted that “more than one defendant can be the
proximate cause of [an injury] and therefore liable for causing injury.” Id. at 1222
(citation omitted).
34. See id. at 1228 (“When the sender knows that the text will reach the driver
while operating a vehicle, the sender has a relationship to the public who use the
roadways similar to that of a passenger physically present in the vehicle.”); see also
Blair P. Keltner, Note, Texters Beware: Analyzing the Court’s Decision in Kubert v. Best,
75 A.3d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013), 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 125, 126 (2014)
(explaining that “the court analogized a remote texter to a passenger’s relation-
ship with a driver” (citing Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1228)).
35. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227 (explaining context of passenger’s duty not to
distract driver).
36. See id. at 1221 (“[A] person sending text messages has a duty not to text
someone who is driving if the texter knows, or has special reason to know, the
recipient will view that text while driving.”).  The court reiterated that when a party
sends a text message to a person they know to be driving, and knows that the
recipient “will read the text immediately,” the texter “has taken a foreseeable risk
in sending a text at that time.” See id. at 1227.  Because a texter in this situation
7
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“has knowingly engaged in distracting conduct,” the court concluded that it is fair
“to hold the sender responsible for the distraction.” See id.
The court attempted to limit its holding by explaining that “[i]mposing a duty
on a passenger to avoid any conduct that might theoretically distract the driver
would open too broad a swath of potential liability in ordinary and innocent cir-
cumstances.” See id.  However, the court explained, because its holding focused on
foreseeability, it was tailored closely enough to avoid overextending the duty owed
by remote texters: while “[i]t is foreseeable that a driver who is actually distracted
by a text message might cause an accident . . . it is not generally foreseeable that
every recipient of a text message who is driving will neglect his obligation to obey
the law and will be distracted by the text.” Id. The court’s heavy focus on the
element of foreseeability in establishing the theory of sender liability is born from
the close relation between foreseeability and one of the requisite elements of a
negligence claim: proximate cause. See id. at 1221 (“On appeal before us, plaintiffs
argue that Colonna is potentially liable to them if a jury finds that her texting was a
proximate cause of the accident.”).  To prove a negligence claim, a plaintiff must
prove that: (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the defen-
dant breached this duty, (3) the defendant’s breach was the actual cause of the
resulting injury to the plaintiff, (4) the defendant’s breach was the proximate cause
of the resulting injury to the plaintiff, and (5) harm to the plaintiff.  See id. at 1222
(reciting elements of negligence claim).
Every person owes a “duty of care” to other persons, meaning every person
should reasonably avoid causing harm to others. See The Importance of Foreseeability
Tests in Personal Injury Cases, CRAVEN, HOOVER, & BLAZEK P.C. (Jan. 6, 2016), http:/
/www.chblawfirm.com/blog/the-importance-of-foreseeability-tests-in-personal-in-
jury-cases/ [https://perma.cc/YCJ2-ZXNU] (explaining negligence element of
duty).  Placing other people in harm’s way can breach this duty and result in in-
jury. See generally id. (discussing elements of negligence).  The actual cause of an
injury is straightforward, and is often screened for by using a “but-for” test: but for
the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff would not have suffered injury. See Elements of
a Negligence Case, THOMSON REUTERS: FINDLAW, http://injury.findlaw.com/acci-
dent-injury-law/elements-of-a-negligence-case.html [https://perma.cc/RD5Q-
BQU5] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018) (explaining but-for causation).  Proximate cau-
sation, however, speaks to the “legal cause” of an accident, and exists only where
the plaintiff’s injury is the natural and foreseeable result of the defendant’s ac-
tions. See Proximate Cause, THEVIRGINIALAWYER.NET, https://www.thevirginialawyer
.net/legal-news/personal-injury/proximate-cause/ [https://perma.cc/532M-
LQHR] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (discussing proximate causation).  For exam-
ple, if a driver drives negligently and hits a pedestrian on the sidewalk with his car
as a result, the driver is the actual cause of any injury resulting to the pedestrian
from the collision. See id. (discussing causation).  However, if the pedestrian walks
away from the accident uninjured but mentally disoriented, continues to walk
down the street and into the yard of a rabid dog, who then attacks and injures the
pedestrian, the driver who hit the pedestrian with his car is not the proximate
cause of any injuries resulting to the pedestrian from the dog attack because the
dog attack was not a natural or foreseeable result of the driver’s negligent driving.
See id. (using rabid dog example to explain causation).  This result is supported by
the generally accepted policy that it is unfair to hold people responsible for per-
forming a duty of care to persons who are not foreseeably at risk of harm, for
doing so would implicate practically unlimited liability and litigation. See generally
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (clarifying concept of proxi-
mate causation). The concept of foreseeability serves as the bedrock principle for
the theory of sender liability. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227 (focusing on foreseeabil-
ity).  As previously explained, the Kubert court reasoned that if a person sends a
text message to someone they know is driving and will open the message, the
sender has created a foreseeable risk of harm to the public by knowingly distract-
ing the driver. See id. (explaining holding).  Therefore, the court concluded, the
8
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Further, the court emphasized its obligations to consider fairness and
public policy.37  It explained that when a grave harm can be prevented
using a relatively low amount of effort, imposing a duty is fair.38  It also
mentioned the public’s interest in the establishment of “fair measures to
deter dangerous texting while driving.”39  Lastly, the court stressed that it
is for the judiciary, not the legislature, to define the scope of duty in negli-
gence cases.40
Judge Marianne Espinosa concurred in the result reached by the ma-
jority but criticized its analysis.41  She argued that it was unnecessary for
the court to “articulate a new duty specific to persons in remote locations
who send text messages to drivers” because “traditional tort principles” are
sender is not only the actual cause but also the proximate cause of any resulting
accident the driver has with a third party and can be held responsible for this third
party’s resulting injuries because these injuries are a natural and foreseeable result
of the texter’s negligent decision to text the driver. See id. (“However, if the sender
knows that the recipient is both driving and will read the text immediately, then
the sender has taken a foreseeable risk in sending a text at that time.  The sender
has knowingly engaged in distracting conduct, and it is not unfair also to hold the
sender responsible for the distraction.”).
37. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1223 (“[W]hether a person owes a duty of reasona-
ble care toward another turns on whether the imposition of such a duty satisfies an
abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of
public policy.  That inquiry involves identifying, weighing, and balancing several fac-
tors—the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportu-
nity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed
solution. . . . The analysis is both very fact-specific and principled; it must lead to
solutions that properly and fairly resolve the specific case and generate intelligible
and sensible rules to govern future conduct.” (quoting Estate of Desir ex. rel. Es-
tiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1258 (N.J. 2013) (emphasis added) (internal cita-
tions omitted))).  The court also noted its obligation to “take into account
‘generally applicable rules to govern societal behaviors’” instead of coming to a
conclusion that would “[reach] only the particular circumstances and parties
before the Court” on that day. See id. (quoting Vertus, 69 A.3d at 1258).
38. See id. at 1228 (“When the defendant’s actions are ‘relatively easily cor-
rected’ and the harm sought to be prevented is ‘serious,’ it is fair to impose a
duty.” (quoting Podias v. Mairs, 926 A.2d 859, 866 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007))).
39. See id. at 1229 (“Finally, the public interest requires fair measures to deter
dangerous texting while driving.  Just as the public has learned the dangers of
drinking and driving through a sustained campaign and enhanced criminal penal-
ties and civil liability, the hazards of texting when on the road, or to someone who
is on the road, may become part of the public consciousness when the liability of
those involved matches the seriousness of the harm.”).
40. See id. (“We have been asked to decide the status of the law in these cir-
cumstances, and we have applied traditional tort principles, as developed in analo-
gous cases, to delineate the limited scope of a remote texter’s duty. . . . ‘It has long
been true that determinations of the scope of duty in negligence cases has tradi-
tionally been a function of the judiciary.’” (quoting Vertus, 69 A.3d at 1258) (inter-
nal quotation, citation, and alteration omitted)).
41. See id. at 1229–30 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“I concur in the result we
reach today. . . .  Still, I do not agree that it is necessary for us to articulate a new
duty specific to persons in remote locations who send text messages to drivers, and
I part company with my colleagues in their analysis of the duty imposed.”).
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sufficient to decide these issues.42  Moreover, Judge Espinosa contended
that “[t]ext messages received while driving plainly constitute a distraction
the driver must ignore.”43
Even if creating a new duty had been appropriate, Judge Espinosa
asserted that the majority’s passenger liability analysis was flawed because a
remote texter not present in the vehicle at the time of the accident “lacks
the first-hand knowledge” of the driver’s circumstances that a physically-
present passenger would have and also has much less control over the
driver.44  Lastly, Espinosa stressed that the legislature had made no indica-
tion of considering policies like those advanced by the majority, and may
have even opposed them, effectively criticizing the majority’s stance on the
judiciary’s power to introduce this new duty.45
B. New York’s Rejection of Sender Liability in Vega v. Crane
In February of 2017, the Supreme Court of Genesee County, New
York was urged to accept the theory of sender liability in Vega.46  In Vega,
Collin Ward Crane crossed the center line of the road while driving, caus-
ing a head-on collision with the plaintiff’s vehicle, killing Crane, and seri-
ously injuring Vega.47  Crane’s cell phone revealed that he was texting his
girlfriend, Taylor Cratsley, moments before the crash.48  Vega added Crat-
42. Id. at 1229–30 (explaining primary reason for concurrence).
43. Id. at 1230.  Judge Espinosa noted that a driver’s “responsibility includes
the obligation to avoid or ignore distractions created by other persons, whether in
the automobile or at a remote location, that impair the driver’s ability to exercise
appropriate care for the safety of others.” Id.
44. Id. (disputing majority opinion’s analogy of sender liability to passenger
liability).
45. See id. at 1233 (disapproving majority’s creation of new duty without con-
sideration from legislature).  Judge Espinosa stated:
The dangers associated with text messaging while driving, and the devas-
tating consequences in this case, were known to the Legislature.  We have
nothing before us that reflects whether the Legislature considered legisla-
tion that would have imposed either civil liability or criminal penalties for
a remote texter who sends a distracting text message to a driver.
Id.  She also explained that recent legislative action regarding an amendment to
the state’s “assault by auto statute” had altered the grading of reckless conduct by
the severity of injury sustained to the victim, “not on whether a cell phone was in
use.” See id. (Espinosa, J., concurring).  Judge Espinosa described this legislative
response as “measured, even as to the driver,” and emphasized that it “did not
include any action as to the remote texter,” implying that the legislature had not
considered imposing liability on remote texters who cause distracted driving acci-
dents. See id.
46. See Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (“Plaintiff would
have this Court adopt the reasoning employed by the New Jersey Appellate Divi-
sion in Kubert to deny [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment.”).
47. See id. at 265.
48. See id.  This determination coincided with a conclusion made by police
that Crane had been distracted at the time of the accident, “as there were no signs
that [Crane] attempted to avoid or take evasive measures to elude contact with the
Plaintiff’s vehicle.” See id.
10
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sley to the action, alleging that her texts caused Crane’s distraction and,
thus, the accident.49
Cratsley argued she owed no duty to Vega and moved for summary
judgment.50  In response, Vega cited to Kubert and argued that New York
public policy justified establishing a special relationship between Vega and
Cratsley, and thus a duty.51  The court held that one who sends a text
message to a driver does not owe a duty to protect a third party from harm
that might result from the driver becoming distracted and granted Crat-
sley’s motion.52
The court began its analysis by considering the lack of New York pre-
cedent that would create a duty owed from Cratsley to Vega.53  It then
clarified that, historically, “courts in New York have either been reluctant
to broaden the principle of negligence law or simply refused to do so.”54
Accordingly, the court explicitly refused to “broaden the scope of duty
from what should be reasonably foreseeable,” despite the holding of the
New Jersey court in Kubert.55
The Vega court distinguished the passenger liability analysis used by
the Kubert court, explaining that a greater “nexus” undoubtedly exists be-
49. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s claims against remote texter, Cratsley).
50. See id.  Cratsley argued that because no duty existed in New York to “con-
trol” a third party’s actions, “no special relationship” between herself and the
plaintiff existed and, thus, no duty was owed to Vega. Id.
After being added to the suit, Cratsley testified that although she had texted
Crane before the accident, she was not aware that he was driving at the time. See
id.  She supported her claim by stating that Crane was often given rides from family
members. See id.  She further testified “that she never expected nor asked [Crane]
to send her text messages or read text messages while driving.” Id.  None of the
recovered text messages from Crane’s phone disproved Cratsley’s testimony. See
id.
51. See id. at 265–66 (explaining that plaintiff cited Kubert to argue for theory
of sender liability, but noting plaintiff acknowledged no New York precedent cre-
ated a sufficient special relationship between sender and injured party).
52. See id. at 271 (“This Court agrees that, no matter how careless it may seem,
not all conduct creates a duty to an unknown.  This is especially true when the
record fails to establish that the defendant had any knowledge that [Crane] was
driving the vehicle that ultimately struck the Plaintiff.”).
53. See id. at 267 (“The argument advanced by Plaintiff is unique in New York
when considering the established body of precedent on the issues of proximate
cause, foreseeability, and duty.”).  The court cited the infamous case of Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. to explain that in order to recover for negligence, a party must
first prove a duty, as well as standard of care, breach of said duty, and proximate
causation between the breach and the plaintiff’s injury. See id. at 266 (citing Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)).  The court stated that “[s]ince
Palsgraf, New York courts have carefully examined those components to establish
negligence and have elaborated on them to justify a recovery for damages.” Id.
54. Id. at 267.
55. See id. at 268 (“Here, Plaintiff asks to modify this standard to broaden the
scope of duty from what should be reasonably foreseeable.  In particular, Plaintiff
is asking that a party texting a person who could be driving should be held liable
for the foreseeable risk that might result from this conduct.  Although New Jersey
may wish to employ such a departure, this Court declines to do so.”).
11
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tween a driver and his passenger than between a driver and a remote tex-
ter.56  It then examined the state’s common law doctrine on the duty
owed by physicians to third parties.57  Although a court in New York had
once imposed a duty upon medical providers to “third-party motorists for
patients whose medication might affect their ability to drive,” the Vega
court explained the application of this holding was narrow and limited to
the reasonably foreseeable victims.58
The Vega court implied that even if Cratsley knew Crane was driving
when she texted him before the accident, Cratsley still could not be held
56. See id. at 268–69 (criticizing analogy drawn between passenger liability and
sender liability).  The Vega plaintiff relied on Sartori v. Gregoire to argue that “a
passenger may be held liable for verbally or physically distracting a driver” in the
moments before an accident. Id. at 266, 268 (citing Sartori v. Gregoire, 688
N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)).  However, the court argued that the facts of
Sartori were distinguishable from the facts of Vega, because “[i]n Sartori, ‘the defen-
dant commenced a third-party action against a passenger in her vehicle, alleging that
his unwanted sexual advances towards her immediately before she started her vehi-
cle caused her to forget to turn on the vehicle’s headlights.’” See id. (emphasis
added).  Although the Sartori court held that “a passenger in a car may be liable if
he distracted the driver while operating the vehicle immediately prior to the acci-
dent,” Cratsley was not in the vehicle at the time of the accident in Vega. See id. at
269.  Therefore, the Sartori ruling was not applicable because Cratsley was not af-
forded the “first-hand knowledge the defendant in Sartori enjoyed.” See id.  Fur-
ther, the court explained that Sartori did “not address . . . whether a third party,
who has no knowledge whether a defendant was driving, owes any duty to others.”
Id.
57. See id. at 269–71 (discussing New York’s common law doctrine on the duty
owed by physicians to third parties).  For a discussion of the duties to third parties
that New York and Pennsylvania impose on physicians, see infra notes 119–38 and
accompanying text.
58. See id. at 270 (citing Davis v. S. Nassau Cmtys. Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 614, 618
(N.Y. 2015)) (stating that the Davis court held that negligence liability “must al-
ways be limited by what is foreseeable” and explaining standard New York practice
of refusing to broaden principle of negligence law).  In Davis, after a physician
failed to warn his patient that the medications he prescribed to her could impair
her ability to drive, the patient attempted to drive her car and struck the vehicle of
the plaintiff. See Davis, 46 N.E.3d at 616.  The court ruled that because the packag-
ing of the medication administered to the patient before the accident listed clear
instructions to warn patients of the side effects of the medication, which included
impaired driving ability, the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff to warn the
patient of this side effect. See id. at 622.
In light of the ruling in Davis, the Vega court asserted that in situations where
New York had extended physician liability to third parties, there had been a clear
nexus between the plaintiffs “and the offending defendant, for whom a special
relationship allegedly existed” as “extension[s] of a duty physicians owed their pa-
tients.” See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 271.  For example, it argued that the Davis court
“understood that when modifying the question of duty, its reach must always be
limited by what is foreseeable,” and “warned not to misinterpret its decision as a
full erosion of the duty of care.” See id. at 270–71 (citing Davis, 46 N.E.3d at 624).
The Vega court also discussed the dissenting opinion in Davis as being “certainly
instructive in dissuading a haphazard expansion of the concept of duty.” See id. at
271 (citing Davis, 46 N.E.3d at 628 (Stein, J., dissenting)).
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liable for Vega’s death.59  If the theory of sender liability was adopted, the
court argued, a dramatic expansion of liability to all people who send text
messages would result because of the wide array of parties who communi-
cate via text message, as well as the many different purposes for which text
messages are exchanged.60  Lastly, the court did not see itself fit to estab-
lish a theory of sender liability when it had not been considered by the
legislature.61
III. SO WHAT’S THE SITCH?  EXISTING PENNSYLVANIA LAW AND
PRECEDENT RELEVANT TO SENDER LIABILITY
Gallatin, filed in July of 2015, marked Pennsylvania’s first opportunity
to address the theory of sender liability in Pennsylvania.62  Before a mo-
tion for summary judgment was argued in Gallatin, the parties agreed to
dismiss the case; thus, the trial court did not address the merits of the
argument, but acknowledged the possibility of sender liability in a motion
to dismiss order.63  Nevertheless, plaintiffs could use the Gallatin court’s
59. See id. at 271 (refusing to adopt theory of liability that could potentially
render all those who send text messages liable for injuries caused in texting-while-
driving cases).  The court stated, “no matter how careless it may seem, not all con-
duct creates a duty to an unknown.  This is especially true when the record fails to
establish that the defendant had any knowledge that the Decedent was driving the
vehicle that ultimately struck the Plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis added).
60. See id. (justifying rejection of duty from Cratsley to plaintiff because “the
expansion of liability to individuals who text message would be exponential”).  The
court felt that expanding duty as far as requested by the plaintiff in Vega “would set
a crushing exposure to liability, which Courts generally must protect against.” See
id. (citation omitted).  It pointed out that text messages are exchanged for an al-
most endless array of purposes day to day, including to spread important news,
notify patients when their prescriptions “are ready for pick up,” remind people to
pay overdue bills, and more. Id.  For this reason, the court concluded that “the
potential expansion as contemplated by the Plaintiff [would be] astronomical.” Id.
61. See id. at 272 (explaining reluctance to expand duty as common law even
though court was aware of efforts made by New York and other states to combat
dangers of texting and driving because court did not “believe it [to be] the prov-
ince of a Court to establish a precedent for want of a statute that otherwise [had]
not been considered, let alone approved, by a legislative body”).  In addition to the
Vega court’s refusal to adopt the theory of sender liability as advanced by the plain-
tiff, it also asserted that “[i]t is not the role of the judiciary to sit on high and
promulgate what it believes should have been a policy determination made else-
where.” See id.  Instead, the court felt it more appropriate to defer “to the wisdom,
or absence of it, of the legislature in defining what is actionable and what is not.”
See id. (citations omitted).
62. See Gallatin v. Gargiulo, No. 10401 of 2015, C.A., 2016 WL 8715650, at *1
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Lawrence Cty. Mar. 10, 2016).  The court declared itself “unaware
of Pennsylvania precedent specifically regarding the duties or liability of the
sender of a text message to a person who is simultaneously operating a motor
vehicle.” See id. at *4.
63. See Kunkle, supra note 17 (describing how following testimony in Gallatin
it became clear that the texter did not know the recipient was driving at the time).
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opinion as persuasive authority in future cases.64  In examining whether
or not Pennsylvania should accept this theory as law, it is important to
consider the recent rulings on preliminary objections raised in Gallatin, as
well as current texting and driving law in Pennsylvania and areas of Penn-
sylvania law analogous to the theory of sender liability.65
A. Pennsylvania Court Allows Gallatin v. Gargiulo to Proceed
Against Remote Texters
In Gallatin, Daniel Gallatin was allegedly slowing down to make a
right-hand turn on his motorcycle as Laura Gargiulo traveled behind him
in her car.66  Purportedly, as Ms. Gargiulo neared Gallatin’s motorcycle,
she was text messaging Joseph Gargiulo or Timothy Fend from her cell
phone.67  The complaint avers that the text messages distracted Ms. Gargi-
ulo, which caused her to hit Gallatin’s motorcycle.68  As a result, Gallatin
was “pinned and dragged” under Ms. Gargiulo’s vehicle and later died
from his injuries.69  Gallatin’s estate sued Mr. Gargiulo and Fend for
negligence.70
Both Mr. Gargiulo and Fend filed preliminary objections, requesting
that the charges filed against them be dismissed with prejudice.71  In re-
sponse, the court acknowledged the lack of specifically-applicable and
binding Pennsylvania precedent, but cited Kubert to suggest the applicabil-
ity of sender liability.72  The court also cited section 876 of the Restate-
ment, which instructs that “a third party can be liable if he/she
encourages another in violating a duty.”73  Bearing in mind both the
Kubert ruling and section 876 of the Restatement, as well as its obligation
64. See generally Gallatin, 2016 WL 8715650 (sustaining plaintiff’s compliant
premised on sender liability).
65. For a discussion of the recent rulings in Gallatin, current texting while
driving law in Pennsylvania, and areas of Pennsylvania law analogous to the theory
of sender liability, see infra notes 66–138 and accompanying text.
66. See Gallatin, 2016 WL 8715650, at *1 (discussing allegations made in
complaint).
67. See id.
68. See id. (“The Complaint further avers that Defendant Laura E. Gargiulo
was distracted by the cell phone and was inattentive, causing her to strike the rear
of Decedent’s motorcycle.”).
69. See id. (discussing facts of case and injuries sustained by victim after being
dragged approximately 100 feet under Ms. Gargiulo’s vehicle).
70. See id.
71. See id. at *3.  Fend argued that the claims against him should be dismissed
because no applicable law imposed “a duty of liability for a person who merely
sends a text message . . . to a person operating a vehicle.” See id.  Similarly, Mr.
Gargiulo argued that he owed no duty to the plaintiff to refrain from texting his
wife while she was driving. See id. at *5.
72. See id. at *4 (acknowledging lack of Pennsylvania precedent but citing
Kubert and explaining its holding as possible mechanism of liability in Gallatin).
73. Id. at *3–4.  The court provided section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which states:
§ 876 Persons Acting in Concert
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to consider all averments made in the preliminary objection stage in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court ruled that Mr. Gargiulo and
Fend would remain parties to the case.74
B. Current Texting and Driving Law in Pennsylvania
Current Pennsylvania law prohibits drivers from texting while driv-
ing.75  Recent state legislation increased the penalties for texting and driv-
ing behavior that causes serious bodily injury or death.76  No statutory law
or case law in Pennsylvania addresses the liability of a remote texter for
injuries caused by the message’s recipient who read the message while
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of an-
other, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a com-
mon design with him, or
(b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious
result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.
Id. at *3–4 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876
(AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
74. See id. at *4–5 (overruling defendants’ preliminary objections and refus-
ing to dismiss case against them).  The court explained that while the defendants
may not have known or have had reason to know, that Ms. Gargiulo was driving
when they sent her text messages, because the case was at the preliminary objec-
tion stage, all averment had to be considered in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See id.  “In reflecting upon Section 876 of the Restatement and Kubert,
and in considering the averments in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as the
law requires, the Court conclude[d] that” the defendants should remain parties to
the case. Id.  Both objections were denied in order to allow the plaintiff the
chance to explore, through discovery, whether either defendant had indeed vio-
lated a duty. See id.
75. See 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3316 (West 2018).
§ 3316. Prohibiting text-based communications.
(a) Prohibition.—No driver shall operate a motor vehicle on a highway
or trafficway in this Commonwealth while using an interactive wireless
communications device to send, read or write a text-based communica-
tion while the vehicle is in motion.  A person does not send, read or write
a text-based communication when the person reads, selects or enters a
telephone number or name in an interactive wireless communications
device for the purpose of activating or deactivating a voice communica-
tion or a telephone call.
Id.
76. See Press Release, Press Office of Governor Tom Wolf, Governor Wolf Signs
Bill to Deter Texting and Driving (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.governor.pa.gov/gover
nor-wolf-signs-bill-to-deter-texting-and-driving/ [https://perma.cc/8S36-HN3H]
(“Today, Governor Wolf signed ‘Daniel’s Law,’ which enhances the penalties for
an accident caused by texting while driving resulting in serious bodily injury or
death.”).  “Daniel’s Law” was enacted as an effort to emphasize the serious conse-
quences of texting and driving, and “is named for Daniel Gallatin, a father, grand-
father, military veteran, and fireman of nearly 40 years who was killed in May of
2013 when his motorcycle was struck from behind by someone who was texting
while driving.” Id.  For further discussion of Daniel’s Law, see supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
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driving.77  Although Gallatin marked the first time a Pennsylvania court
had the opportunity to address the theory of sender liability, several areas
of existing, analogous Pennsylvania law should inform the next court that
renders a decision on the merits.78
C. Analogous Sections of Pennsylvania Law That Should Inform the
State’s Stance on Sender Liability
To analyze which side of the sender liability debate Pennsylvania
should fall, the next Pennsylvania court to consider the issue in light of
the Gallatin opinion should consider several areas of existing state law
analogous to sender liability.79  First, state law on passenger liability
should be considered because both the Kubert and Vega courts analogized
it to sender liability.80  Second, Pennsylvania courts should consider both
the duties owed by a social host to their guests and those owed by a physi-
cian to third parties because both involve the legal obligations of remote
third parties and, therefore, can be analogized to sender liability.81
1. Passenger Liability
The courts and commentators that have discussed the theory of
sender liability have taken different views on the analogy of sender liability
to passenger liability and the duty owed by passengers riding in a vehi-
cle.82  In Pennsylvania, while no duty is generally owed by passengers, “[a]
77. See Gallatin, 2016 WL 8715650, at *4 (“The Court is unaware of Penn-
sylvania precedent specifically regarding the duties or liability of the sender of a
text message to a person who is simultaneously operating a motor vehicle.”); see
also supra note 75 for Pennsylvania law that prohibits drivers from texting-while-
driving.
78. For a discussion of the areas of law that should inform a decision on
whether to adopt sender liability in Pennsylvania, including passenger liability, so-
cial host liability, and the duty owed from physicians to third parties, see infra notes
79–138 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Gough, supra note 21, at 476–78 (discussing analogous areas of
law drawn on by the Kubert court); Strider, supra note 13, at 1012–17 (analogizing
social host liability, duty not to distract the driver, and products liability to sender
liability).
80. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1224–25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013);
Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 268–69 (Sup. Ct. 2017).  For a discussion of the
operation of passenger liability in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 82–111 and accom-
panying text.
81. See, e.g., Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 269 (comparing sender liability and physician
third-party liability); Strider, supra note 13, at 1014 (noting that social host liability
is analogous to sender liability because neither were present for the incident).  For
a discussion of social host liability and the duty owed by physicians to third parties
in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 117–38 and accompanying text.
82. Compare Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1221, 1224–25 (analogizing passenger liability
to sender liability and finding existence of sender liability), with Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d
at 268–69, 271 (discussing passenger liability and sender liability and rejecting the
existence of sender liability), and Strider, supra note 13, at 1012 (“Although the
situation in Kubert itself is unique, it shares similarities to other tort cases in which
courts have traditionally imposed civil liability.  For example, there are a number
16
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passenger may owe a duty to protect a third person from negligent acts of
the driver where there is a ‘special relationship, joint enterprise, joint ven-
ture, or a right to control the vehicle.’”83  Pennsylvania courts have often
declined to extend liability to passengers who allegedly distract drivers,
who then get into accidents.84
of parallels between the situations of a remote third-party texter and a passenger in
the vehicle who is distracting the driver.”).  Strider explained that although the
situations are analogous to a certain extent, they differ because the remote texter
is not physically present in the car when the accident occurs, while a passenger is.
See Strider, supra note 13, at 1013.  Additionally, she argued that the choice to
“open and read a text” while driving differs from the unavoidable physiological
reaction that occurs when a driver is yelled at or visually distracted by a passenger.
See id.
83. See 13 DALE G. LARRIMORE, ESQ., WEST’S PA. PRAC., § 8:15 (2016–17 ed.
2016) (quoting Welc v. Porter, 675 A.2d 334, 340–41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)) (ex-
plaining when passenger owes duty).  According to Larrimore:
This might include situations where the passenger “encouraged [the
driver] to demonstrate the vehicle’s performance ability[,]” encouraged
the driver to ignore the speed limit, provided alcohol to the driver while
he drove the vehicle, encouraged the operation of the vehicle by a driver
in an impaired condition by continuously refilling a marijuana pipe, or
“forced, pressured or induced” the driver to drink alcohol while the
driver was operating the car.
Id. (quoting Welc, 675 A.2d at 338–39).  A passenger may also owe a duty to a third
party “where the driver is acting as the passenger’s servant or agent or where the
passenger has the ‘right of equal control’ of the vehicle.” Id. (citing Welc, 675 A.2d
at 340–41).  In order to establish agency, “there must be ‘a manifestation by a
principal that an agent shall act for him,’ followed by an acceptance by the agent
of the undertaking, and a mutual understanding by both parties ‘that the principal
is to be in control of the undertaking.’” Id. (quoting Clayton v. McCullough, 670
A.2d 710, 713–14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (internal citations omitted).  Agency must
be established explicitly; it cannot be assumed. See id. (citing Volunteer Fire Co. of
New Buffalo v. Hilltop Oil Co., 602 A.2d 1348, 1351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
Passenger liability has most frequently been examined in Pennsylvania in re-
gards to a “passenger’s ability to recover when a defendant contends that the pas-
senger contributed to the accident by his or her conduct.” See id.  Pennsylvania
passengers may have a duty to “act in the face of manifest danger . . . when the
passenger had a duty equally with the driver to observe.” See id. (citing Nutt v. Pa.
R.R. Co., 126 A. 803, 805 (Pa. 1924)).  However, generally, passengers have no duty
to “pay close attention to the actions of the driver.” See id. (first citing Kilpatrick v.
Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 138 A. 830, 833 (Pa. 1927) (holding passenger not “negli-
gent for reading a newspaper and not paying attention to road”); and then citing
Simrell v. Eschenbach, 154 A. 369, 371 (Pa. 1931) (holding “passenger not negli-
gent for sleeping at time of the crash”)).  Passengers also “will not be held to be
negligent, as a matter of law, for failing . . . to interfere with the driver in the
operation of the vehicle.” Id. (citing Landy v. Rosenstein, 188 A. 855, 857 (Pa.
1937) (“To require a guest to take part in driving an automobile from a rear seat
position would destroy the efficiency of the driver.”)).
84. See, e.g., Clayton v. McCullough, 670 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(affirming dismissal of complaint and therefore declining to extend liability to pas-
senger); Salemmo v. Dolan, 159 A.2d 253, 255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) (refusing to
extend liability to passenger); Resseguie v. Reynolds, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 558, 565
(Ct. Com. Pl. Union Cty. 1991) (refusing to extend liability to passenger), aff’d,
613 A.2d 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).  For a discussion of Pennsylvania court decisions
17
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In Resseguie v. Reynolds,85 Richard Resseguie was hit and killed by
Daniel Klingler.86  At the time of the accident, Steven Reynolds was a pas-
senger in Klingler’s vehicle.87  Representatives for Resseguie sued Reyn-
olds for distracting Klingler while he was driving in violation of the “quiet
passenger duty.”88
In addressing this theory of liability, the court emphasized that the
primary duty in question was owed from the driver to the decedent and
had clearly been violated.89  Although the plaintiff argued a duty was owed
by the passenger of the vehicle—which might include “the duty not to
actively interfere with the driver, by blinding his vision, or affecting the
steering, or throwing matter into his lap or upon his feet”—such a duty
had not been recognized in Pennsylvania.90  The court explained that
while the quiet passenger duty represents issues of important societal con-
cern, similar distractions occur in cars carrying loud children or friends
sharing food.91  The court cited Salemmo v. Dolan92 in which the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania ruled that a driver’s testimony that his passenger
requested he light her cigarette spoke only to his own negligence, and that
even if the court believed his story about his passenger’s request, “it would
be tenuous evidence of contributory negligence” by the passenger.93  The
Resseguie court refused to expand Pennsylvania law by recognizing “the
declining to extend liability to passengers who allegedly distracted drivers, leading
to accidents, see infra notes 85–110 and accompanying text.
85. 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 558 (Ct. Com. Pl. Union Cty. 1991), aff’d, 613 A.2d 34
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
86. See id. at 558.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 559, 562.  The plaintiff claimed Klingler distracted the driver by
handing him beer, speaking to him, and adjusting the radio while the vehicle was
in motion. See id. at 562.  This argument was “premised upon fundamental negli-
gence principles, i.e., defendant had a duty not to interfere with the driver and
breached that duty, causing injury to a third party to whom the passenger is re-
sponsible.” Id. at 560.
89. See id. at 562 (“The principal duty in issue is the duty of due care of the
driver Klingler.  The breach of that duty, as set forth in plaintiff’s complaint, was
evidenced by speeding, crossing the center line, and proceeding in the wrong
lane.”).
90. See id. (“If, as plaintiff suggests, a separate duty arises from the passenger
to the decedent, no Pennsylvania court has yet recognized it.”).  In Resseguie, the
defense counsel argued that the so-called quiet passenger duty “probably includes
the duty not to actively interfere with the driver, by blinding his vision, or affecting
the steering, or throwing matter into his lap or upon his feet.” Id.
91. See id. at 563 (“In this case, the allegations are certainly a cause for societal
concern.  In essence, however, the same distractions are prevalent in cars which
contain crying babies or tired adolescents, or riders who share ice cream cones.”).
92. 159 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960).
93. See Resseguie, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th at 563 (explaining denial of passenger’s
negligence in Salemmo); see also Salemmo, 159 A.2d at 255 (explaining evidence that
passenger was contributorily negligent was “extremely weak”).
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passenger’s contributory negligence to a theory of independent liability
for injuries to third parties.”94
In contrast, some Pennsylvania courts have held passengers negligent
for distracting drivers.95  These cases have generally involved a passenger
physically interfering with the driver’s ability to attend to the road.96  For
example, Pennsylvania passengers have been held negligent for kissing
drivers and showing them documents.97
The Pennsylvania ruling in Clayton v. McCullough98 further represents
the modest duty owed by passengers in the state.99  In Clayton, pedestrian
Fred Herrod was hit and killed by Sandra Steinhoff.100  Rebecca McCul-
lough was a passenger in the car when the accident occurred.101  Alleg-
edly, Steinhoff and McCullough were drinking before entering the car on
the night of the accident.102  Before the accident, McCullough requested
Steinhoff allow her to drive the car because she felt Steinhoff was too in-
toxicated to drive but Steinhoff refused.103  As Steinhoff began to drive
“erratically,” McCullough saw the decedent on the side of the road.104
94. See Resseguie, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th at 564.  The Resseguie court noted that its
reluctance to expand Pennsylvania law in this way relied in part on the state’s his-
torical rejection of both the family purpose doctrine and the joint enterprise the-
ory of vehicular liability. See id.  Instead, Pennsylvania courts have “accented the
right to control the operation of the vehicle.” See id. (citation omitted).  Because
“no right to control the vehicle” or “allegations of interference with the vehicle”
had been presented, the driver and passenger had engaged in a joint enterprise,
“lubricated by alcohol, and ending in tragedy.” Id. at 565.  As no state cases had
“extended responsibility to a passenger to actively avert such a tragedy,” the passen-
ger could not be held liable. See id.
95. See, e.g., Lyons v. Wargo, 126 A.2d 411, 411–12 (Pa. 1956) (finding passen-
ger negligent for distracting driver by leaning over to kiss him which “inspired”
him to respond to her); Campbell v. Campbell, 175 A. 407, 407–08 (Pa. 1934)
(allowing issue of contributory negligence to be submitted to jury because suffi-
cient evidence existed to show grandmother passenger distracted granddaughter
driver by engaging her in examination of documents). But see Welc v. Porter, 675
A.2d 334, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (declining to hold passenger-defendant liable
under theory that passenger had right to control car that intoxicated driver was
operating).
96. See, e.g., Lyons, 126 A.2d at 412 (blaming passenger for distracting driver
and thus causing accident).
97. See Lyons, 126 A.2d at 411–12 (concluding passenger was negligent for
distracting driver by leaning over to kiss him which “inspired” him to respond to
her); Campbell, 175 A. at 407–08 (allowing issue of contributory negligence to be
submitted to jury because sufficient evidence existed to show grandmother passen-
ger distracted granddaughter driver by engaging her in examination of
documents).
98. 670 A.2d 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
99. See id. at 714 (affirming dismissal of complaint and therefore failing to
extend liability to passenger).
100. See id. at 711.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 712.
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McCullough warned Steinhoff of the decedent’s presence but Steinhoff
nonetheless proceeded to strike him with the vehicle.105
Herrod’s estate sued McCullough for negligence, and also alleged
that Steinhoff acted as an agent for McCullough, making McCullough vi-
cariously liable for her actions.106  On appeal, the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania first reasoned that in order to hold McCullough liable, the
plaintiff would need to prove that she had violated a duty, and that duties
arise only in certain situations.
Although each person may be said to have a relationship with the
world at large that creates a duty to act where his own conduct
places others in peril, Anglo-American common law has for cen-
turies accepted the fundamental premise that mere knowledge of
a dangerous situation, even by one who has the ability to inter-
vene, is not sufficient to create a duty to act.107
Next, the court explained that although Clayton argued her theory of
liability under section 876(b) of the Restatement—which regards a party
as negligent who has “given substantial assistance or encouragement” to
another party in violating a duty—the court had not adopted the section
and, therefore, was not bound by it.108  Even if it had adopted section
876(b), the court explained, no factual averments existed in the complaint
to suggest McCullough had given Steinhoff such assistance.109  Further,
the court ruled that Clayton had failed to establish an agency relationship
105. See id. at 711–12.
106. See id. at 712.  McCullough filed preliminary objections for failure to
state a cause of action, which were sustained and the complaint dismissed. See id.
Clayton appealed the decision. See id.
107. Id. (quoting Elbasher v. Simco Sales Serv. of Pa., 657 A.2d 983, 984–85
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)) (explaining that knowledge of dangerous situation does not
create duty to act).  For an opposing view regarding a passenger’s duty, see, e.g.,
ROBERT RAMSEY, 25 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, MOTOR VEHICLE L. & PRAC. § 10:8 (4th
ed. 2016) (“Until there is evidence of unsafe driving, there is no duty by a passen-
ger to supervise the driving, keep a lookout for danger or to warn of danger.  How-
ever, when it becomes apparent to a reasonably prudent passenger that the vehicle
in which he or she is riding is being driven negligently, reasonable care requires
the passenger to protest or argue with the driver in an effort to persuade him to
drive carefully.  If such protests are disregarded, the passenger has a duty to leave
the car when a reasonable opportunity is afforded, if a reasonably prudent person
would do so in like circumstances.” (footnotes omitted)).
108. See Clayton, 670 A.2d at 713 (explaining that Pennsylvania had not previ-
ously adopted section 876(b) of the Restatement); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 876(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979) (explaining third-party liability when
that party has “give[n] substantial assistance or encouragement to” another party
in violating a duty).
109. See Clayton, 670 A.2d at 713 (“[T]here are no factual averments in the
complaint to indicate that McCullough gave ‘substantial assistance or encourage-
ment to [Steinhoff] so to conduct [her]self[.]’” (alterations in original) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979))).
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between Steinhoff and McCullough.110  As a result, the court affirmed the
decision to dismiss Clayton’s complaint.111
2. Social Host Liability
The theory of sender liability has recurrently been compared to social
host liability—the liability imposed on social hosts for alcohol-related inju-
ries that occur as a result of the host serving alcohol to guests.112  These
forms of liability are similar because neither the social host nor the remote
texter is physically present when the accident occurs but can nonetheless
be held responsible for the injuries and damage sustained.113  However,
Pennsylvania does not recognize social host liability, except as it applies to
adults who serve alcohol to minors.114  Adult social hosts in Pennsylvania
owe no duty to third parties for serving alcohol to guests of legal drinking
age, even if they are aware that their guests will drive drunk.115  The Res-
110. See id. at 714 (“Here, the facts averred that McCullough requested that
Steinhoff drive her to the American Legion.  Such a contention, in and of itself, is
not sufficient to establish an agency relationship.”).
111. See id.
112. See Jennifer Edelson, Note, “ETA?” Estimated Time of Arrival: An Analysis of
New Jersey’s Remote Texting Liability, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1939, 1956 (2016) (“Per-
haps the most analogous form of imputed liability to remote texting is social host
liability.”); Strider, supra note 13, at 1014 (“The situation in Kubert also bears some
similarities to social host liability . . . .”); Social Host Liability, THOMSON REUTERS:
FINDLAW, http://injury.findlaw.com/accident-injury-law/social-host-liability.html
[https://perma.cc/P9NM-TYTH] (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) (“Most states have
enacted laws holding party hosts liable for any alcohol-related injuries that occur as
a result of providing alcohol to minors.  This includes injuries to the minor as well
as any other individuals whose injuries or death resulted from the minor being
provided with alcohol.  Some states have more general social host liability laws,
which are not limited to just minors but to anyone who was encouraged or allowed
to drink excessively to the point where he or she was injured or killed, or caused
another’s injury or death.”).
113. See Strider, supra note 13, at 1014 (“Similar to the liability of a remote
third-party texter, social host liability implicates a person not present at the place
and time of the event giving rise to the cause of action.”).
114. See Social Host Liquor Liability Laws in Pennsylvania, DRAM/DUI LAWYERS,
http://dramduilawyers.com/pa/social-host-laws/ [https://perma.cc/PLZ4-8NYJ]
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“Social hosts . . . can only be held accountable for
injuries caused by people under the age of 21, Pennsylvania’s legal drinking age.”);
see also Dram Shop Liquor Liability Laws, DRAM/DUI LAWYERS, http://dramduilawy-
ers.com/pa/dram-shop-laws/ [https://perma.cc/LZG5-ZZ8G] (last visited Nov.
20, 2017) (noting that Pennsylvania does, however, have “dram shop laws,” which
impose liability on “any licensed establishment that sells alcohol to a visibly intoxi-
cated patron can be held liable for injuries caused by that patron after they leave
the premises”).
115. See Manning v. Andy, 310 A.2d 75, 75 (Pa. 1973) (affirming lower court
ruling that “[o]nly licensed persons engaged in the [s]ale of intoxicants have been
held to be civilly liable to injured parties”); see also LARRIMORE, supra note 83, § 8:15
(“Adult social hosts owe no duty to third parties for providing alcoholic beverages
to adult guests, even when the host is aware a guest will drive while intoxicated.  An
individual who furnishes alcohol to a driver cannot be held liable for injuries to
third parties if the person providing the alcohol is a minor.  Further, an adult or
21
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seguie court clarified Pennsylvania’s stance that “it is the consumption of
alcohol rather than the furnishing thereof, that is the proximate cause of
any subsequent damage.”116
3. A Physician’s Liability to Third Parties
The plaintiff in Vega supported her assertion that the court could
hold a remote texter responsible for her injuries by citing New York prece-
dent establishing a duty to warn their patients of the potential side effects
of medicines administered to them owed by physicians to third parties.117
Like social host liability, this form of liability is similar to sender liability in
that it allows for the imposition of a duty on a remote third party.118  How-
ever, the Vega court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, instructing that al-
though New York had expanded the scope of a duty owed in the previous
negligence action cited, it did so with great caution, reluctance, and sup-
port from sound policy reasoning.119
Similarly, Pennsylvania courts have been reluctant to hold physicians
liable for negligent patient treatment that allegedly injured third par-
minor who is merely a passenger in a vehicle where the driver is intoxicated does
not owe a duty to a third person absent a showing that the passenger forced or
coerced the driver to drink while operating the car.  Absent a ‘special relationship,
joint enterprise, joint venture or a right to control the vehicle,’ a passenger does
not owe a duty to a third person in instances where the driver of the car is intoxi-
cated or when the passengers participated ‘in the joint procurement and ingestion
of alcohol’ with the driver.” (citations omitted)).
Several other states impose similarly modest duties on social hosts. See, e.g.,
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100–101 (McKinney 2018) (providing that liability for
injuries caused by intoxicated tortfeasor under age of twenty-one limited to sellers
of alcohol). Some states place much heavier burdens on social hosts. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.6 (West 2018) (assigning liability to social hosts who serve
alcohol to intoxicated guests that negligently operate vehicles and cause personal
injury or property damage as result); Dower v. Gamba, 647 A.2d 1364, 1367 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (discussing codification of social host liability by New
Jersey legislature).
116. See Resseguie v. Reynolds, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 558, 561 (Ct. Com. Pl. Union
Cty. 1991) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Congini v. Portersville Valve
Co., 470 A.2d 515, 517 (Pa. 1982)), aff’d, 613 A.2d 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
117. See Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 269 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (stating plaintiff’s
reliance on holding in Davis v. South Nassau Communities Hospital in arguing for
expansion of foreseeability doctrine).  For a discussion of the Vega court’s response
to this argument advanced by the plaintiff, see supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
118. See, e.g., Davis v. S. Nassau Cmtys. Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 614, 623 (N.Y. 2015)
(holding physicians liable to third-party motorists for failing to notify patients that
their medication could impair their ability to drive).
119. See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 271 (“Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals ex-
panded the breadth of the duty owed in a negligence case, it did so cautiously and
reluctantly.”).
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ties.120  In Soto v. Frankford Hospital,121 the court ruled that physicians who
treated a woman exposed to dangerous levels of carbon monoxide in her
home owed no duty to her husband, also living in the home, who later
died as a result of the fumes and that the physicians’ incorrect diagnosis of
the woman’s condition had not caused her husband’s death.122  After re-
viewing doctors’ duties concerning the spread of infectious diseases, the
Soto court held that any negligence committed by the doctors was too
far removed from the decedent’s death to be considered legally
responsible.123
Moreover, in both Crosby v. Sultz124 and Waddell v. Bowers,125 Penn-
sylvania courts declined to hold physicians responsible for failing to pro-
hibit their patients from driving impaired.126  In Crosby, the superior court
ruled that a physician was not liable to an injured third party for failing to
report a diabetes patient to the Department of Motor Transportation.127
The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code mandates that patients may not drive if, in
their physicians’ opinion, any of several enumerated conditions, including
120. See S. GERALD LITVIN & GERALD AUSTIN MCHUGH, JR., 3 WEST’S PENN-
SYLVANIA PRACTICE, TORTS: LAW AND ADVOCACY § 7.6 (2016) (explaining that courts
in Pennsylvania “have been hesitant to impose liability on a physician for acts of
negligence in treating a patient which are alleged to have had an adverse impact
on some third-party rather than the patient”).
121. 478 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
122. See id. at 1136–37 (“For these reasons, we have concluded that the defen-
dant physicians did not owe a duty to plaintiff’s husband, nor was the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant physicians a substantial cause of [the plaintiff’s husband’s]
injuries.”).  The plaintiff argued that had the doctors made the proper diagnosis,
she would have been afforded the opportunity to take appropriate steps and pre-
vent her husband’s death. See id. at 1135.
123. See id. at 1136 (explaining that doctors could not foresee injury to the
husband, and moreover, husband would have suffered injuries regardless of treat-
ment given to wife).  The court explained that the doctors’ actions did not cause
the plaintiff’s husband’s death because (1) the plaintiff’s doctors were not obli-
gated to control the conduct of the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff and her husband
were not injured “by a communicable disease,” and (3) the plaintiff’s husband
“was not injured as a result of an act performed by” the plaintiff. See id.
124. 592 A.2d 1337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
125. 609 A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
126. See Waddell, 609 A.2d at 851 (holding doctors did not owe duty third
party where advice or treatment was not necessary to prevent harm to individuals
other than the patient); Crosby, 592 A.2d at 530 (holding that doctor owes no duty
to third parties to control patient’s driving).
127. See Crosby, 592 A.2d at 1338 (holding “that a doctor has no duty to con-
trol his patient’s driving habits or to protect third persons from the injuries occa-
sioned by unforeseeable accidents”).  In Crosby, Ms. Crosby and her children were
walking when struck by a vehicle being driven by James Jackson. See id.  Ms.
Crosby, her children, and her husband filed suit against Jackson to recover for the
severe injuries they sustained. See id. at 1338–39.  During discovery, it was deter-
mined that Dr. Sultz had been treating Jackson for diabetes, which had caused him
to lose consciousness behind the wheel and hit the plaintiffs with his car. See id. at
1339.  Dr. Sultz filed preliminary objections alleging, among other things, that the
Crosbys had failed to state a cause of action. See id. at 1339–40.  His objections
were sustained, and the Crosbys appealed. See id. at 1340.
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“[u]nstable or brittle diabetes,” are likely to interfere with their ability to
drive.128  The court concluded that the condition of the patient in ques-
tion did not qualify under the statute, and even if it did, the statute cre-
ated no private cause of action for third parties.129  The court expressed
that the statutory duty imposed on physicians to report their patients’ con-
ditions to the authorities when appropriate varies significantly from a duty
to protect the public at large from any harm their patients may cause, the
latter of which would “discount the important element of foreseeabil-
ity.”130  Further, the court decided that requiring a physician to (1) deter-
mine that a patient’s diabetes might flare up and cause an accident, and
(2) report the patient’s disability in order to avoid suit if an injured victim
were to pursue legal action would “def[y] logic” and prove “unwork-
able.”131  In Waddell, the same court relied on Crosby to dismiss the plain-
tiff’s third party complaint against her dentist for failure to state a cause of
action, when she alleged that he failed to stop her from driving in a dan-
gerous state.132
128. Id. at 1341 (quoting 67 PA. CODE § 83.5(a)(2) (1986)).
129. See id. at 1343.  The court established that “the issue of whether the phy-
sicians owed a duty to the third persons turned upon the question of foreseeabil-
ity.” See id.  Because the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not foreseeable
victims of any actions or inaction taken by the doctor in regards to the diabetes
patient, it held that the doctor owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. See id. at
1345.
The court concluded that the patient’s medical condition did not fall within
the applicable provision of the Pennsylvania Administrative Code because al-
though the statute called for physicians to report patients suffering “unstable or
brittle diabetes,” physicians did not have to do so if there had been “a continuous
period of at least six months freedom from a related syncopal attack,” which the
patient satisfied. See id. at 1344.  The same reasoning released the doctor’s duty to
report the patient under subsection four of the statute, which prohibited individu-
als experiencing “periodic losses of consciousness, attention or awareness from
whatever cause” from driving. See id. (paraphrasing statutory language).
Further, although the catchall provision provided by subsection nine of the
statute could have applied to the patient at issue, the court determined that this
provision was intended to cover conditions not mentioned anywhere else in the
statute (such as diabetes). See id. at 1344–45.  Finally, the court concluded that
holding a diabetic condition that had not been proven “unstable,” “brittle,” or
“subject to attacks” as encompassed by the statute would ignore the purpose of the
statute’s existing subsection addressing diabetes. See id. at 1345.
130. See id. at 1345 (“To discount the important element of foreseeability here
is effectively to overrule well-established and precedential tort law, as well as to
extend liability limitlessly to treating physicians vis-a-vis third party victims.”).
131. See id. at 1346 (citation omitted) (explaining refusal to hold doctor liable
for plaintiff’s injuries).  The court explained that “the legislature’s goal of ensuring
and promoting safe highways by monitoring the driving abilities of the sick and
infirm is merely tangential to a doctor’s duty to diagnose and treat his/her patient
properly.” Id. at 1347.
132. See Waddell v. Bowers, 609 A.2d 847, 849–50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (rely-
ing on Crosby to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint against her dentist).  Waddell was a
passenger in a vehicle struck by a car operated by appellant Bowers. See id. at 848.
Bowers filed third-party complaints against York Hospital and Dr. Gregory Goding,
who had treated her in the Dental Clinic of the hospital. See id.  While at the clinic,
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Although Pennsylvania courts have been hesitant to hold physicians
liable to third parties, in DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc.133 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that if a third party is at risk of con-
tracting a communicable disease from a patient, and the patient’s physi-
cian gives unsound medical advice to the patient that leads to the
infection of the third party, the third party has a cause of action against
the physician.134  However, the court qualified its ruling by explaining that
Bowers fell ill as a result of her underlying diabetic condition, of which the medical
providers were aware. See id.  Bowers alleged that the providers were negligent in
failing to: (1) “summon a doctor to examine her,” (2) “ensure that she was physi-
cally capable of driving before leaving,” (3) “telephone her family and friends,” (4)
“properly treat her condition[,]” and (5) keep her from “leav[ing] the hospital
when they knew or should have known that she was physically incapable of driv-
ing.” Id.  For these reasons, Bowers proposed that the providers accept legal re-
sponsibility for causing the accident involving Waddell, which took places after
Bowers became ill and left the dental clinic. See id.  The Court of Common Pleas
in York County concluded that Bowers had failed to state a claim for which relief
could be granted and Bowers appealed. See id.
Relying on Crosby, the court held that Bowers had failed to show that the doc-
tors’ treatment of her was necessary for the protection of third parties. See id. at
850.  Because Bowers had not established what treatments the doctors had ren-
dered to her at the clinic, if the doctors knew her diabetes would cause her to fall
unconscious, or what exact condition she was in when she left the clinic, the court
concluded that she failed to show that the doctors should have concluded her
unfit to drive. See id.  Further, the doctors were not treating Bowers for her diabe-
tes, and the court could not “impute to a dentist the knowledge of a physician
treating a person for diabetes.” See id.
133. 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990).
134. See id. at 424.  In DiMarco, Janet Viscichini, a blood technician, was acci-
dentally pricked with a needle that had been used on a patient carrying hepatitis.
See id. at 423.  Viscichini sought the treatment of appellant doctors, who advised
her that if she remained without symptoms for six weeks, she could be sure that
she had not contracted hepatitis. See id.  They did not instruct her to abstain from
sexual activity for any period of time after being exposed to the disease, but she
did so for eight weeks. See id.  After remaining symptom-free for those eight weeks,
she resumed her sexual relationship with appellee, Joseph DiMarco. See id.
Shortly after, both Viscichini and DiMarco were diagnosed with hepatitis B. See id.
DiMarco sued the doctors, alleging that their failure to warn Viscichini “that
having sexual relations within six months of the exposure could cause her sexual
partner to contract hepatitis” was negligent. See id.  The doctors filed preliminary
objections and the complaint against them was dismissed with prejudice for the
lack of duty owed from the doctors to DiMarco. See id.  DiMarco appealed the
decision to the superior court, which reversed and held that the doctors owed a
duty to act reasonably in directing Viscichini on how to prevent the spread of hepa-
titis. See id. (citing DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester Cty., Inc., 559 A.2d 530, 535
n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)).  The doctors appealed. See id. at 424.
In reviewing the decision, the Pennsylvania supreme court stated that as a
requirement of foreseeability, DiMarco would have had to show “that the defen-
dant [had] undertaken ’to render services to another which he should [have] rec-
ognize[d] as necessary for the protection of a third person’ (in this case, the
plaintiff, appellee).” See id. (quoting Cantwell v. Allegheny Cty., 483 A.2d 1350,
1353–54 (Pa. 1984)).  The court concluded that because a physician treating a
patient exposed to a communicable or contagious disease is responsible for giving
such a patient advice on how to prevent the disease from spreading, third parties
at risk of contracting the disease are foreseeably at risk when such advice is not
25
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doctors are the “first line of defense against the spread of communicable
diseases” because they know best how to prevent the spread of such dis-
eases, which justifies holding them responsible for advising affected pa-
tients.135  Because precautions taken by patients suffering communicable
diseases are not meant to protect the already-infected patients but others
likely at risk of infection, the court held that these physicians are responsi-
ble for safeguarding third parties from harm.136  Three justices dissented,
arguing that the physician had no duty to protect a third party he had
neither treated nor been aware existed.137  The dissenters stressed that
“the dangers of adopting a negligence concept of duty analyzed in terms
of scope of the risk or foreseeability are considerable and are to be
avoided.”138
IV. WHEN YA WANNA TEXT ME IT SHOULD BE OKAY IN PENNSYLVANIA:
PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD NOT ADOPT SENDER LIABILITY
Although Pennsylvania has yet to rule on the theory of sender liabil-
ity, an examination of existing state law makes clear that this concept
should not be adopted.139  For this reason, as well as because of the valid-
ity of the criticism the theory has met, the Gallatin court properly dis-
missed the case, and an appellate court should likewise refuse to hold
remote texters responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries.140  Moreover, the
offered. See id. at 424–25.  For this reason, the court affirmed the ruling of the
superior court. See id. at 425.
135. See id. at 424 (“Physicians are the first line of defense against the spread
of communicable diseases, because physicians know what measures must be taken
to prevent the infection of others.  The patient must be advised to take certain san-
itary measures, or to remain quarantined for a period of time, or to practice sexual
abstinence or what is commonly referred to as ‘safe sex.’”).
136. See id. (“Such precautions are taken not to protect the health of the pa-
tient, whose well-being has already been compromised, rather such precautions are
taken to safeguard the health of others.”).  The court explained that “the duty of a
physician in such circumstances extends to those ‘within the foreseeable orbit of
risk of harm.’” Id. (quoting Doyle v. S. Pittsburgh Water Co., 199 A.2d 875, 878
(Pa. 1964)).  Therefore, if a third person falls within the “foreseeable orbit” and is
“likely” at risk of infection from the patient, “and if erroneous advice is given to
that patient to the ultimate detriment of the third person, the third person has a
cause of action against the physician, because the physician should recognize that
the services rendered to the patient are necessary for the protection of the third
person.” Id. at 424–25.
137. See id. at 426–27 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that ex-
panding professionals’ scope of liability to unknown third parties could cause pro-
fessionals to render valuable services in a more limited way to avoid liability).
138. See id. at 426 (explaining dangers of “adopting a negligence concept of
duty analyzed in terms of scope of the risk or foreseeability,” especially when scope
of foreseeability extends to unknown potential third parties).
139. For a discussion of why analyzing existing state law suggests that Penn-
sylvania should not adopt sender liability, see infra Part IV.
140. For a discussion of the criticism of sender liability, see infra Part IV(A).
See generally Kunkle, supra note 17.
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court should follow the reasoning employed by the Kubert concurrence in
deciding to reject the theory of sender liability.141
A. An Analysis of Existing Pennsylvania Law Relevant to Sender Liability
and the Criticisms of Kubert
Pennsylvania courts have established that the duty to avoid distracted
driving accidents rests primarily with drivers, which opposes the funda-
mental policies that underlie the theory of sender liability.142  For exam-
ple, Pennsylvania courts have imposed relatively modest duties on
vehicular passengers, which suggest that it would be extraordinary for the
state to hold remote texters liable to injured parties even if it likened them
to passengers physically present in vehicles.143  In Resseguie, the plaintiff
driver attempted to hold his passenger responsible for the accident the
driver caused by way of violating the quiet passenger duty.144  The court
rejected this argument, and began its analysis by reiterating the primary
duty in question: the “duty of due care” owed by the driver.145  This will be
a difficult barrier to overcome for the next plaintiff that cites to the Galla-
tin opinion in an effort to hold remote texters liable for causing a dis-
tracted driving accident.146
141. For a discussion of the concurring opinion in Kubert and why the next
Pennsylvania court to consider sender liability should follow the Kubert concur-
rence rather than the Gallatin opinion, see infra Part IV(B).
142. Compare Resseguie v. Reynolds, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 558, 564–65 (Ct. Com.
Pl. Union Cty. 1991) (refusing to shift blame for car accident to passenger who was
distracting), with Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1221, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2013) (establishing theory of sender liability on the principal idea that it is
foreseeable to text message sender that the driver could become distracted by
reading the message).  The Kubert court reasoned that when a person sends a text
message to another person they know to be driving and knows that the driver will
view the text while driving, that person has disregarded a substantial risk of “harm
to the public.” See id. at 1228.  The Kubert court further explained that because the
extreme danger presented by texting while driving—which the public has great
interest in deterring—could be easily remedied by imposing a duty on texters to
avoid texting drivers, the holding was justified. See id. at 1228–29.
143. Compare LARRIMORE, supra note 83, § 8:15 (“To hold a passenger liable
for injuries sustained by a third party, the plaintiff must show that the passenger
‘breached a duty or obligation recognized by law, which required him to conform
to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of persons such as the plaintiff.’
Such a duty would arise out of general negligence principles, not out of any duty
imposed by the Vehicle Code.” (quoting Merritt v. City of Chester, 496 A.2d 1220,
1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985))), with RAMSEY, supra note 107, § 10:8 (“In general, a
passenger in a motor vehicle is charged with two basic responsibilities under New
Jersey law.”).
144. See Resseguie, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th at 562 (declining to hold that passenger
violated quiet passenger duty).
145. See id. (“The principal duty in issue is the duty of due care of the
driver . . . .”).
146. See Keltner, supra note 34, at 126 (“[I]t was unnecessary for the [Kubert]
court to formulate a new duty regarding a remote third party’s obligation not to
text the driver of a motor vehicle because the duty to avoid texting while driving
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The Resseguie court relied on Salemmo to support its refusal to impose
the quiet passenger duty.147  In Salemmo, the driver argued that his passen-
ger was responsible for an accident he caused because she requested he
light her cigarette while driving, which the court held did not establish
negligence.148  Requesting a driver to light a cigarette can be compared to
texting a driver you know to be driving, because in both situations the
driver is invited to physically divert attention from the road while still
maintaining the ability to decide whether or not to do so.149  In both
Salemmo and texting-while-driving cases, an affirmative act taken by the
driver (causing the collision) breaks the chain of causation between the
risky behavior (a sender’s text message or a passenger’s distracting re-
quest) and a dangerous display of negligence (texting or lighting a passen-
ger’s cigarette while driving).150  On the other hand, Pennsylvania cases
holding passengers responsible for distracting drivers support the impor-
tance of holding passengers responsible for the situations they directly
cause in part while in the car.151
In addition to holding drivers responsible for circumstances within
their control, Pennsylvania courts have held that passengers who are aware
of dangerous conditions owe no duty to prevent harm to vulnerable third
parties.152  The Clayton court clarified that while morality may create a
duty to act when a person’s “own conduct places others in peril,” the law
has traditionally refused to hold that awareness of a dangerous situation,
even when the option to intervene is available, creates a legal duty to
should fall solely on the driver.”); supra note 71 and accompanying text for an
explanation of the defense advanced in Gallatin.
147. See Resseguie, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th at 563 (relying on Salemmo v. Dolan for
proposition that fact driver allowed himself to become distracted by passenger’s
behavior only bolstered argument in favor of driver’s negligence).
148. See Salemmo v. Dolan, 159 A.2d 253, 255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) (explain-
ing failure of driver’s argument that passenger committed contributory negligence
for asking him to light her cigarette while driving because it was “doubtful
whether [passenger’s] request constituted contributory negligence”).
149. See Strider, supra note 13, at 1013 (“[O]pening and reading a text mes-
sage is voluntary.  The driver must choose to open the text message and read it.
He is in no way forced to react to the receipt of the message.  In fact, he has the
option to simply ignore the message until a safer time presents itself.”).
150. See id. (“The driver has to choose to be distracted by a text message . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
151. See id. (“A person’s decision to open and read a text message is distinct
from their physiological reaction to a stimulus presented to them.  A driver has no
choice but to hear the words yelled at him by a passenger or to see the object put
in his line of vision by a passenger.  His reaction to that stimulus represents more
of an unavoidable physiological response than a voluntary undertaking.”).  For a
discussion of Pennsylvania cases holding passengers responsible for physically dis-
tracting drivers, see supra notes 82–111 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Clayton v. McCullough, 670 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(declining to impose passenger liability when passenger was merely aware driver
may have breached duty, but passenger did not contribute or participate in that
breach).
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act.153  This general principle can be applied to remote texters who may
know the recipients of their messages will pose harm to nearby motorists
and pedestrians by reading their messages while driving.154
A similar premise underlies Pennsylvania’s stance on the duty owed by
social hosts.155  In Pennsylvania, social hosts owe duties only to underage
drinkers they serve alcohol to.156  Thus, hosts in the state owe nothing to
guests of legal drinking age who they know might be too intoxicated to
safely drive themselves home.157  Notably, New York, the first state to re-
ject sender liability, holds social hosts to a similarly modest duty, while
New Jersey, which developed the theory of sender labiality, places much
greater obligations on social hosts.158
153. See id. at 712 (“Although each person may be said to have a relationship
with the world at large that creates a duty to act where his own conduct places
others in peril, Anglo-American common law has for centuries accepted the funda-
mental premise that mere knowledge of a dangerous situation, even by one who
has the ability to intervene, is not sufficient to create a duty to act.” (quoting
Elbasher v. Simco Sales Serv. of Pa., 657 A.2d 983, 984–85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995))).
154. See Keltner, supra note 33, at 137 (arguing that Kubert court “mistakenly
held a remote sender has any duty at all to avoid texting someone they know is
driving, as the duty to avoid texting while driving falls completely on the driver”).
155. For a discussion of the duty owed by social hosts, see supra notes 112–16
and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 510–11 (Pa. 1983) (distinguish-
ing between liability that arises when serving minors alcohol versus serving of-age
persons alcohol).
157. See, e.g., Manning v. Andy, 310 A.2d 75, 75 (Pa. 1973) (holding that non-
licensed person who provides alcohol to eventual tortfeasor owes no duty of care
to third parties).
158. Compare N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100–101 (McKinney 2018) (provid-
ing cause of action against provider of alcohol only if provider furnished alcohol to
someone under age twenty-one), with Dower v. Gamba, 647 A.2d 1364, 1367 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (discussing codification of social host liability in New
Jersey).  New Jersey’s social host liability statute declares:
b. A person who sustains bodily injury or injury to real or personal prop-
erty as a result of the negligent provision of alcoholic beverages by a so-
cial host to a person who has attained the legal age to purchase and
consume alcoholic beverages may recover damages from a social host
only if:
(1) The social host willfully and knowingly provided alcoholic beverages
either:
(a) To a person who was visibly intoxicated in the social host’s pres-
ence; or
(b) To a person who was visibly intoxicated under circumstances
manifesting reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the
life or property of another; and
(2) The social host provided alcoholic beverages to the visibly intoxi-
cated person under circumstances which created an unreasonable risk of
foreseeable harm to the life or property of another, and the social host
failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid the foreseeable
risk; and
(3) The injury arose out of an accident caused by the negligent opera-
tion of a vehicle by the visibly intoxicated person who was provided alco-
holic beverages by a social host.
29
Cronin: Call Me, Beep Me, if Ya Wanna Reach Me -- Unless I Might Be Drivi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
350 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 321
Pennsylvania’s policy reflects the legislature’s opinion that it is the
responsibility of the guest, not the host, to avoid causing alcohol-related
accidents.159  Thus, because awareness of dangerous conditions does not
trigger a legal duty owed by third parties in Pennsylvania, the same should
remain true for remote texters.160  The duty to avoid distracted driving
accidents should reside with drivers, who are responsible for making the
ultimate decision to text while driving.161
Further, while holding vehicular passengers and remote texters re-
sponsible for distracting behavior could serve important societal concerns,
imposing such duties would reach further than is fair or feasible.162  For
example, the Resseguie court noted that a crying child in the backseat of a
car would risk violating the proposed quiet passenger duty.163  Compara-
bly, although the dangers of texting and driving are great, holding remote
texters liable for accidents caused by drivers they text extends liability to a
seemingly endless class of people who reasonably should know the recipi-
ent is driving or could be driving.164
Pennsylvania courts have likewise exhibited an unwillingness to hold
physicians liable to third parties, thus providing additional support for the
rejection of the analogous theory of sender liability.165  In Frankford Hospi-
tal, the court refused to hold doctors liable for the death of a patient’s
husband after misdiagnosing his wife, who had been poisoned by excess
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.6(b)(1)–(3) (West 2018).  “Provide” as used in the stat-
ute has been held to include “self-service by guests.” Social Host Liability, supra note
112.
159. Cf. Resseguie v. Reynolds, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 558, 561 (Ct. Com. Pl.
Union Cty. 1991), aff’d, 613 A.2d 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (explaining that “in the
case of an ordinary able-bodied man, it is the consumption of alcohol rather than
the furnishing thereof, that is the proximate cause of any subsequent damage”
(citing Orner v. Mallick, 527 A.2d 521, 523 (Pa. 1987))).
160. For a discussion of why awareness of dangerous conditions does not a
trigger a legal duty owed by passengers or social hosts in Pennsylvania, see supra
notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
161. See Edelson, supra note 112, at 1962 (“One obvious critique of imputing
liability on remote texters is that it was the illegal act of the driver, not the actions
of the remote individual, which actually caused the accident.”).
162. See, e.g., Resseguie, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th at 563 (refusing to extend duty owed
by passengers, despite pressing societal concerns, for fear of it reaching too far);
Edelson, supra note 112, at 1962 (criticizing Kubert court for ignoring principles of
proximate cause and foreseeability).
163. See Resseguie, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th at 563 (“In this case, the allegations are
certainly a cause for societal concern.  In essence, however, the same distractions
are prevalent in cars which contain crying babies or tired adolescents, or riders
who share ice cream cones.”).
164. See, e.g., Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 271 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (“In this day
and age, where texts are routinely sent to, for example, advise the public of break-
ing news, that prescriptions are ready for pick up, or to advise that a bill is to be
paid, the sender would be responsible for any injuries that could be caused should
a driver become distracted by their receipt.”).
165. For a discussion of the duty owed by physicians to third parties in Penn-
sylvania, see supra notes 119–38 and accompanying text.
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levels of carbon monoxide, because they ruled his death too far removed
from the negligent medical treatment provided to their patient.166  Fur-
ther, in Crosby, the court refused to hold a doctor responsible for injuries
sustained by a third party after failing to prevent his patient from driving
while impaired.167  The Vega plaintiff argued for a similar duty, but fell
short of convincing the court to adopt sender liability.168  Alternatively, in
DiMarco, a Pennsylvania court held a doctor liable for negligently advising
a patient suffering a communicable disease on how to manage the condi-
tion, which ultimately led to the infection of a third party, but the court
justified its decision by explaining that the nature of a doctor’s job when
treating patients suffering communicable diseases goes directly to prevent-
ing their spread.169  The court explained that this circumstance created a
foreseeable risk and thus duty owed to vulnerable third parties.170  How-
ever, unlike the doctor in DiMarco, remote texters are not the “first line of
defense” against automobile accidents—drivers are.171
166. See Soto v. Frankford Hosp., 478 F. Supp. 1134, 1135–36 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(refusing to extend physicians’ liability to third party husband of patient).
167. See Crosby v. Sultz, 592 A.2d 1337, 1347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (refusing
to extend liability to physician when third party was victim of motor vehicle acci-
dent caused by patient).  In Crosby, the court expressed that requiring a physician
to (1) define when a patient’s condition might cause an accident and (2) report
the patient’s disability in order to avoid being sued by an injured third party would
create far too heavy a burden on physicians. See id. at 1346.  The Crosby court
stated:
We would decline to impose upon the treating physician the burden of
not only determining the possibility that a patient’s diabetes may flare up
and act as the causal link to a subsequent accident, but in addition, re-
porting the illness in light of the physician’s “diagnosis” and prognosis so
as to avoid liability if the injured victim sues.  This responsibility defies
logic and is unworkable.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 544 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
168. For a discussion of the plaintiff’s argument in Vega and why the Vega
court found it insufficient to justify the theory of sender liability, see supra notes
56–61 and accompanying text.
169. See DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester Cty., Inc., 583 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa.
1990) (holding physician liable to third party for failing to prevent spread of com-
municable disease).
170. See id. at 424–25 (justifying extension of physician’s liability to infected
third party).  For a discussion of the justification offered by the DiMarco court for
extending the liability of the defendant physician to a third party, see supra notes
134–36 and accompanying text.
171. See DiMarco, 583 A.2d at 424 (“Physicians are the first line of defense
against the spread of communicable diseases, because physicians know what mea-
sures must be taken to prevent the infection of others.”).  The element of foresee-
ability that justified holding the physician in DiMarco responsible to a third party is
lacking for remote texters, unless they are assumed to expect that the drivers they
text will break the law and read their message while driving. See Edelson, supra
note 112, at 1964–65 (“Proponents of remote texting liability may argue that, in
light of the prevalence of distracted driving in today’s society, experience informs
senders of text messages that a recipient may reach for the phone while driving.
However, the problem with this line of reasoning is that it suggests that senders of
text messages should anticipate that the recipient will violate the law.”).  Moreover,
because the choice to text and drive is made affirmatively by the driver, “it can be
31
Cronin: Call Me, Beep Me, if Ya Wanna Reach Me -- Unless I Might Be Drivi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
352 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 321
Lastly, Crosby addressed the applicability of a statute requiring doctors
to report patients with certain medical conditions to the Department of
Motor Transportation and concluded not only that the driver’s condition
did not fall under the statute, but also that the statute did not create a
private cause of action for third parties.172  Similarly, the court in Resseguie
acknowledged that the type of duty advanced by the plaintiff had not been
recognized as state law.173  Correspondingly, while current Pennsylvania
law prohibits texting while driving and assigns harsh penalties for texting-
while-driving-related accidents that result in grave injury, no private cause
of action against remote texters has been acknowledged.174
B. Pennsylvania Should Follow the Kubert Concurrence
Instead of adopting sender liability, Pennsylvania courts should follow
the concurrence in Kubert, which argued that creating a new duty was both
unnecessary and unwise because “traditional tort principles” could have
been used to decide the case, and the Pennsylvania legislature had made
no indication of considering imposing liability on remote third parties
who send distracting text messages to drivers.175  The concurrence advo-
cated for placing the burden of avoiding texting-while-driving-related acci-
dents on drivers instead of texters.176  Because prior Pennsylvania
precedent has demonstrated a likelihood of agreeing with this opinion,
Pennsylvania courts should rely on existing law imputing liability to third
parties for aiding and abetting others in violating a duty to evaluate claims
brought against remote texters.177  Even if Pennsylvania were to adopt
argued that the driver’s illegal operation of the motor vehicle [is] an unforesee-
able intervening cause of the accident.” See id. at 1965.
172. See Crosby, 592 A.2d at 1344–46 (explaining that even though physicians
have a reporting duty, that duty did not create a third party cause of action against
physician).
173. See Resseguie v. Reynolds, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 558, 562 (Ct. Com. Pl. Union
Cty. 1991) (“If, as plaintiff suggests, a separate duty arises from the passenger to
the decedent, no Pennsylvania court has yet recognized it.”), aff’d, 613 A.2d 34 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992).
174. For a discussion of existing Pennsylvania law concerning texting while
driving, see supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
175. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1232, 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2013) (Espinosa, J., concurring) (arguing lack of necessity and legislative support
for establishment of sender liability).
176. See id. at 1230 (arguing that driver’s responsibility “includes the obliga-
tion to avoid or ignore distractions created by other persons, whether in the auto-
mobile or at a remote location, that impair the driver’s ability to exercise
appropriate care for the safety of others”).
177. See Edelson, supra note 112, at 1975 (advocating use of aiding and abet-
ting analysis over application of sender liability in examining liability of remote
texters).  Edelson argued that, as asserted in the Kubert concurrence, existing tort
principles are sufficient to evaluate the liability of remote third parties in texting
and driving cases. See id.  Edelson did not deny the potential liability of remote
texters, but suggested that in such situations courts “defer to an aiding and abet-
ting analysis” which is “a preexisting and widely recognized tort doctrine.” See id.
Conveniently, in addition to the theory of sender liability, the Gallatin court relied
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sender liability, the legal standard set forth in Kubert is very hard to satisfy,
so texters should rest assured that their texts are unlikely to trigger liabil-
ity.178  Moreover, this topic may be better suited for debate in the
legislature.179
on section 876 of the Restatement when allowing the case to proceed against re-
mote texters, which imposes liability on parties who assist other parties in breach-
ing a duty. See Gallatin v. Gargiulo, No. 10401 of 2015, C.A., 2016 WL 8715650, at
*3–4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Lawrence Cty. Mar. 10, 2016) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)) (allowing case to proceed against
remote texters).
178. See Strider, supra note 13, at 1017–19 (explaining difficulty of proving
liability under Kubert standard).  Strider explained that sender liability can be ap-
plied when a texter either has actual knowledge that the recipient of the message
would read it while driving or has a special reason to know that the driver would
read the text while driving. See id. at 1017.  Plaintiffs will have difficulty proving the
first scenario because text message services are not “100 percent reliable” for guar-
anteed delivery, making it hard to show that the texter knew with certainty that the
recipient would read the message. See id. (citing Maisie Ramsay, Is SMS Reliability a
Problem?, WIRELESS WEEK (Apr. 2, 2010, 09:25 AM), http://www.wirelessweek.com/
articles/2010/04/sms-reliabilityproblem [https://perma.cc/5PY5-PWPH]).  Addi-
tionally, it is hard to prove that a texter knew for certain whether the recipient of
their message was driving. See id. at 1018–19.  Discussing the difficult knowledge
standard under this theory of liability, Strider argues:
Although the sender might anticipate that the recipient will be driving
when he receives the message, the inherent unpredictability of the future
makes absolute certainty difficult.  For example, the driver might make
an unexpected stop for a variety of reasons—a health emergency, a vehi-
cle emergency, such as a lack of gasoline or a flat tire, or simply the desire
to stop and get a cold drink—and therefore, might not read the message
while driving.
Id.  Further, proving that the sender had special reason to know the recipient
would open the message while driving is difficult because although past experi-
ence could inform the texter that the recipient often reads text messages while
driving, “[p]ast conduct is not necessarily indicative of future behavior.” See id. at
1019.
179. See Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 272 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (“It is not the
role of the judiciary to sit on high and promulgate what it believes should have
been a policy determination made elsewhere.”).  It is important to allow the legis-
lature to decide whether to adopt the theory of sender liability because, given
Pennsylvania’s reluctance to hold passengers, social hosts, and physicians liable to
third parties, the legislature may choose to increase the duties owed by drivers in-
stead of by remote parties. See, e.g., Crosby v. Sultz, 592 A.2d 1337, 1340 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (explaining that Pennsylvania imposes affirmative duty on physi-
cians to report patient conditions that render them incapable of driving).
After the Vega court refused to adopt the theory of sender liability for lack of
support from the legislature, the legislature addressed the dangers posed by text-
ing and driving by introducing legislation that would require drivers involved in
automobile accidents to submit their cell phones for examination by a “textalyzer”
device. See S.B. 2306-A, St. Sen., 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (purporting to
amend existing state laws to “[p]rovide[ ] for the field testing for use of mobile
telephones and portable electronic devices while driving after an accident or colli-
sion”); Assemb. B. 3955, St. Assemb., 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (assembly
version of Senate Bill 2306).  For a discussion of the proposed New York legisla-
tion, see Kieler, supra note 21 (explaining proposed “textalyzer” legislation).  This
device would discern if the driver had been using the phone at the time of the
accident, but would not be able to produce information about the content or ori-
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V. YOU KNOW THAT YOU ALWAYS CAN TEXT KIM POSSIBLE:
A CONCLUSION
Although there is a valuable lesson to be learned from Kubert about
the dangers of texting while driving, existing Pennsylvania law suggests
that the theory of sender liability should not be adopted.180  Instead, the
Pennsylvania courts considering sender liability should rely on existing le-
gal principles to evaluate claims brought against remote texters.181  By do-
ing so, Pennsylvania will establish a majority stance on the issue of sender
liability and set the stage for more states to deny adoption of the theory,
which ultimately fails to hold drivers responsible for their actions and ex-
pands the scope of liability to a dangerous, impractical, and unnecessary
extent.182
gin of communications exchanged. See id.  This legislation reflects New York’s
commitment to holding drivers accountable for their actions instead of imposing
liability on third parties.
180. See Gough, supra note 21, 478–82 (discussing public lessons offered by
Kubert).  Gough argued that in addition to compensating victims of harm for their
injuries, liability rules create incentives to avoid bringing about the harm. See id. at
470.  Ultimately, Gough contends that the theory of sender liability provides “a
valuable instrument of public education about a novel and serious public safety
problem,” and represents “an appropriate example of judicial innovation” when
“[p]ublic service announcements, peer discussion, and even the prospect of a traf-
fic ticket have failed to stem [the] serious hazard” presented by texting while driv-
ing. See id.  For a discussion of existing Pennsylvania law that advises against the
adoption of the theory of sender liability, see supra notes 79–81 and accompanying
text.
181. For a discussion of the existing legal principles that can be used to evalu-
ate claims against remote texters, see supra notes 142–74 and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of how the theory of sender liability fails to hold drivers
responsible for their actions and expands the scope of liability to a dangerous and
unnecessary extent, see supra notes 41–45, 159–64 and accompanying text.
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